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Abstract: In the summer of 2018, after it was revealed that there were 
dangerous levels of lead in the drinking water in Newark, New Jersey, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council and the New Jersey Education 
Workers Caucus filed a lawsuit against the City of Newark. They 
claimed the city did not comply with statutes in the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, Lead and Copper Rule, and New Jersey’s Open Public 
Records Act. This case follows the nationally recognized case in Flint, 
MI, and both cases present undertones of systemic racism through the 
inaction of local governments. While the jury is still out on whether 
the city of Newark will be held responsible, this paper analyzes the 
case, relevant legislation and stakeholders’ strategies. 
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Introduction 
 In the summer of 2018, after it was revealed that there were 
dangerous levels of lead in the drinking water in Newark, New Jersey, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the New Jersey 
Education Workers Caucus filed a lawsuit against the City of Newark. 
They claimed the city did not comply with statutes in the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, Lead and Copper Rule, and New Jersey’s Open 
Public Records Act. This lawsuit follows years of a similar battle in 
Flint, MI that became a nationally publicized case where high levels 
of lead were found in the city after a switch from Detroit’s main water 
system to the Flint River. These cases both present undertones of 
systemic racism in the inaction by local government and the continued 
denial of a problem despite resident complaints and state water 
sampling results suggesting otherwise. This paper analyzes the 
Newark lead water case, legislation relevant to the case, and its 
stakeholders and their strategies to further understand the 
implications of what this court case decision could mean for similar 
problems in the future. 
 Traces of lead in drinking water are extremely dangerous for 
children and pregnant women, leading to developmental issues and 
birth defects. Even healthy adults can suffer from various health 
ailments due to lead exposure including high blood pressure, kidney 
failure, infertility, cardiovascular problems, or cognitive dysfunction. 
This fact alone begs the question why the City of Newark even tried 
to deny lead was a problem in their citizens’ drinking water instead 
of investigating further. Water samples from the city showed 20% of 
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households contained lead levels above the 15 parts per billion (ppb) 
federal action level threshold. Other factors that come into play in the 
case are divisions of responsibility, institutional discrimination, and 
the influence of the ongoing Flint, Michigan lead case in 2014. 
 
Background 
 This issue centers around a few important pieces of US 
legislation. The Clean Water Act protects public health and requires 
certain qualifications for waterways managed by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). It began as the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1948, which was the first major law in the US to 
address water pollution. It provided funds for state and local 
governments to monitor water quality in some communities 
(Environmental Works 2018). In 1962, Rachel Carson wrote her 
famous book, Silent Spring, which sparked the modern environmental 
movement, increased public concern about the environment, and 
instilled a desire to protect our damaged and dwindling natural 
resources. The Environmental Protection Agency was formed in 1970, 
taking on the responsibility of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act of 1948. From 1968 to 1970, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare’s Bureau of Water Hygiene reported 30% of drinking 
water samples in the US had chemicals exceeding recommended 
Public Health Service limits (Environmental Works 2018).   DDT was 
present in 584 of 590 fish samples, 87% of swordfish showed unsafe 
levels of mercury, and record numbers of fish died, accounting for 
millions of dollars in losses to the fishing industry (Environmental 
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Works 2018). There was clearly an urgent need for more regulations 
on the previously unchecked pollution of waterways since two-thirds 
of the nation’s waters had become unsafe for fishing or swimming 
(PBS 2002). While unsafe water was a huge public health issue, there 
are also undertones of market-based allocation with the influence of 
the fishing industry on the decisions to regulate water pollution. 
Without the huge loss of revenue from the contaminated fish, the 
Clean Water Act may have taken longer to emerge. Finally, in 1972 
the Clean Water Act was passed with the goal to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of our nation’s waters” 
and for “zero discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985, 
and fishable and swimmable waters by 1983” (Clean Water Act 2018). 
The act requires permits to pollute from a point source, implements 
standards for industry wastewater, and developed national water 
quality criteria for pollutants in surface waters (Clean Water Act 
2018). While the issue in Newark was due to traces of lead in drinking 
water and not necessarily pollutants, there could have been corrosive 
pollutants in the water that caused the lead to flake off the old 
pipelines in older homes and schools. The lack of immediate action 
by the City of Newark in response to dangerously high lead levels 
weakens the influence of this historic act.  
Another piece of legislation important to this case is the Safe 
Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA). This law focuses specifically 
on the protection of drinking water in America and is more directly a 
protection of public health than anything else, even though there was 
still heavy push back from oil lobbyists because of the increased 
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environmental regulations (Weinmeyer et al. 2017). The SDWA 
requires the EPA to set standards for and oversee all public water 
systems’ drinking water quality, whether they are privately or 
publicly owned, and protects the water from natural or man-made 
contaminants found in drinking water (Weinmeyer et al. 2017). There 
are over 151,000 public water systems in the US, classified by the 
amount of people they serve. However, some schools, hospitals or 
office buildings may have their own non-community non-transient 
water systems that are still under jurisdiction of the SDWA (Public 
Water Systems 2018). Weinmeyer, Norling, Kawarski, and Higgins 
(2017) suggest that while the law has good intentions, its 
implementation and enforcement are severely flawed because once 
the federal regulations are set, the states must follow through to fix 
the problem if: the contaminants might have adverse health effects, 
are likely to be found in public drinking water systems, or will reduce 
public health overall. Difficulties arise because of the massive amount 
of public water systems - excluding private homeowners’ wells – that 
have to account for 83 specific contaminants and each contaminants’ 
specific limits. Because small service providers and private well 
owners are not under jurisdiction of the SDWA, many water systems 
are not well regulated in the US. Inadequate funding to the SDWA 
poses a problem since it is estimated that one trillion dollars is needed 
to update drinking water systems in the US but only $32 billion has 
been allocated in the past 18 years (Weinmeyer et al. 2017). Further 
budget cuts to the EPA in recent years have reduced funds to specific 
programs to help states fix water infrastructure like the WPSS (EPA 
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Office of Water 2017). While larger water systems can bear the cost 
burden of updating their waterlines, many smaller systems cannot 
keep up, delaying state action on installing new treatment devices, 
and making improvements. This has been the main cause of high lead 
levels in various cities across the country, Newark included. 
Additionally, with further scientific research comes more 
contaminants listed as dangerous and reveal health risks of lower 
concentrations of currently listed contaminants (Weinmeyer et al. 
2017). New Jersey specifically has access to grants through the 
Drinking Water State Revolving Fund, operator contracts, and state 
ordered consolidations, which show a collaborative effort to supply 
funds for the state (EPA Office of Water 2017). The state is required 
to test drinking water, and in Newark specifically, the rule recently 
changed from 50 samples over three years to 100 samples over a six-
month period (Yi 2018).  
 The Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) issued in 1991 set a 
required “action level” for lead at 15 parts per billion, even though no 
level of lead in a human’s blood stream is safe (Jennings and Duncan 
2017). Lead-contaminated water is extremely dangerous for children 
and pregnant women, with high risk of permanent neurological 
damage or disability. Even trace amounts of lead in the blood of 
otherwise healthy adults can cause fertility issues, cardiovascular and 
kidney problems, cognitive dysfunction, and high blood pressure 
(Anslem 2018; Jennings and Duncan 2017). The protocols set by the 
LCR were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of water treatments, 
and can miss important fluctuations which may increase the amount 
49 
 
of human exposure to lead (Jennings and Duncan 2017). 
Contaminants that include lead are mainly inorganic chemicals, 
arsenic, asbestos, chromium, copper, fluoride, mercury, nitrate and 
radionuclides, as well as naturally occurring chemicals, 
microorganisms and water turbidity (Jennings and Duncan 2017). 
Corrosion control treatments to protect old pipes are the main 
mitigation strategy when lead is found in drinking water since these 
contaminants cause old pipes to flake lead off into the water stream. 
This current strategy was developed in 1991 and has not since been 
amended despite lead problems across the country becoming more of 
a problem in recent years, such as the case of Flint, Michigan.  
 The lead problem in Flint is very similar to the Newark case, 
as the Natural Resources Defense Council is leading the lawsuit on 
both cases. The Natural Resources Defense Council was established 
in 1970 by law students and attorneys during the environmental 
movement. They are an international non-profit NGO with the goal 
of “ensuring the rights of all people to clean air, clean water, healthy 
communities and the wild” (NDRC 2018). They have over 3 million 
members and employ 600 scientists, lawyers, and policy advocates to 
fight environmental issues in court and in Congress (NDRC 2018).  
 The Flint lead problem began back in 2011 when the State 
of Michigan took over Flint’s finances to combat an expected $25 
million budget deficit following decades of a declining economy due 
to their General Motors plant downsizing in the 1980’s (CNN 2018). 
To reduce the water fund shortage, a pipe switch from Detroit to Lake 
Huron was proposed but the city had to take water from the Flint River 
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while it was under construction starting in 2014 (CNN 2018). 
Residents soon noticed the water tasted and smelled strange, and after 
tests by the EPA and Virginia Tech, it was discovered that there were 
dangerously high levels of lead in almost half of Flint’s households. 
A class-action lawsuit was filed by residents of Flint for lack of proper 
anti-corrosion treatment, a violation of the SWDA and the LCR (CNN 
2018; Weinmeyer et al. 2017; Jennings and Duncan 2017). One 
resident, Lee-Ann Walters’ tap water contained lead levels of 104 ppb, 
almost seven times the EPA’s lead threshold, but a second test showed 
levels as high as 397 ppb after the switch (CNN 2018). The mayor of 
Flint and other community leaders denied that the lead was even an 
issue telling residents to “just relax,” with the mayor drinking a cup 
of tap water on WNEM news (WNEM Newsroom 2015). In 2015, the 
Flint City Council members voted to switch back to Detroit as a water 
source, but the state-appointed emergency manager claimed the costs 
were too high for the switch, demonstrating how the government 
valued costs above the health of its citizens (CNN 2018). A state of 
emergency was declared in early 2016 allowing FEMA to intervene 
and the National Guard was brought in to distribute bottled water, 
almost two years after the initial water testing (CNN 2018). In 2016 
the NRDC filed a lawsuit against the state for violating the Safe Water 
Drinking Act in its slow response to the issue (CNN 2018). The result 
of several lawsuits was a $97 million settlement for Michigan to agree 
to replace all lead water lines, however involuntary manslaughter 
charges were also brought against state officials for the deaths of at 
least 12 people during the crisis (CNN 2018). Since then, it was 
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deemed that the water supply was restored to normal and Flint 
recently ended the free bottled water program in 2018 (Chavez 2018).  
However, there were much deeper implications behind this 
case including institutional, structural, and systemic racism against 
the predominantly black, and poor population of Flint, requiring an 
environmental justice lens (Egan 2017). Housing, employment, and 
education discrimination led to the dispersal of Flint’s current 
population demographics, and gave way to an implicit bias against 
the residents’ complaints by the state. Flint has a population of 98,918 
- of which 54% is black - a 41.9% poverty rate, median household 
income of $25,650 and median property value of $30,000 (Data USA, 
Flint 2018).  
This environmental justice lens can also be applied to the 
Newark case. Newark has a much larger population of 218,770 people 
and a poverty rate of 28.2% but a median household income of only 
$31,100 (Data USA, Newark 2018). Additionally, Newark is 48.7% 
black and 34.4% Hispanic (Data USA, Newark 2018). Newark has 
high property values because of its proximity to New York City, 
however this creates a huge gap between those who work in the city 
and make more money, and the residents below the poverty line. 
These residents’ concerns about the lead in their water were largely 
ignored in the beginning, much like those in Flint. It makes one 
wonder if the same lead levels were found in richer, white 
communities what the response would be. 
One more important piece of legislation to consider for this 
case is New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, which the Natural 
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Resources Defense Council claims the city also violated (Kelly and 
Nunez 2018). The act requires that all government records be 
available unless they violate a citizen’s personal information such as 
hospital records, criminal investigation documents, victim’s records, 
or court orders (NJ Open Public Records Act 2018). However, while 
the act states that agencies have a right to prohibit access to 
information regarding ongoing cases, they cannot do so before the 
investigation officially begins if information was already publicly 
accessible (NJ Open Public Records Act 2018). The City of Newark 
repeatedly denied there was a lead problem and denied citizens’ 
public records requests of water sampling results for their homes 
(Kelly and Nunez, 2018). 
 
Stakeholders, Arguments, & Strategies 
The main stakeholders in this case are Newark City residents, 
city officials, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the New 
Jersey Education Workers Caucus. Water testing in Newark is done 
by the city’s Water and Sewage Department. The department is now 
required to test 100 samples every 6 months, but there are no 
regulations about testing every neighborhood (Imperiale and Wood 
2018). Newark is predominately older homes and despite the threat 
they face having lead service lines, many households did not receive 
testing (Figure 1, Appendix A). It was reported in 2017 that Newark 
has some of the highest recorded lead levels for a large water system 
in the entire nation (Kelly and Nunez 2018). Newark has consistently 
reported the highest levels of childhood blood lead of any 
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municipality in the state, and 22,100 homes in Newark have known 
lead service lines, meaning those lines are more likely to leech lead 
into their water (Kelly and Nunez 2018; New Jersey Department of 
Health 2016). The federal threshold for lead levels in drinking water 
is 15 ppb, but 20% of homes in Newark exceed this limit with 10% 
reporting lead levels over 26 ppb (Kelly and Nunez 2018). A recent 
test in 2018 contained tap samples over 182 ppb – more than 12 times 
the federal action level – with 30 school water samples in Newark 
containing traces of lead (Kelly and Nunez 2018). The New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection issued two non-compliance 
notices to the City of Newark in July 2017 and January 2018, but 
despite pressure from the state, the city still did nothing to remedy the 
situation at the time (Kelly and Nunez 2018).  
The health risks from lead contamination are extremely 
dangerous. For this to occur in a community composed of more than 
83% people of color and 28.2% below the (already underestimated) 
national poverty line, the additional health burdens these faulty lines 
put on the community becomes an environmental justice issue. Low-
income communities of color disproportionately face negative health 
exposure compared to their wealthier, white counterparts (Kelly and 
Nunez 2018). “Access to safe drinking water is particularly important 
in low-income communities of color where residents often face 
multiple sources of exposure and stressors on their health from 
environmental burdens,” said Sara Imperiale (2018), an NRDC 
Environmental Justice attorney during an interview. The EPA has 
since contributed $75 million in funds to replace old lead service lines, 
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with a maximum cost of $1,000 to homeowners, however many 
people are not able to afford that (Carter 2018). 
The position of Newark’s residents relies heavily on state-
based science as that is where all the data regulations regarding 
drinking water originates. Laws established during the environmental 
movement like the Clean Water Act of 1972 and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act of 1974 were put in place to protect people from public 
health concerns and took into consideration scientific evidence of 
problems through identification of harmful contaminants. Their 
position also reflects liberal pluralism – a collaborative approach to 
local government - in their attendance of city hall meetings to voice 
their concerns, and inclusion of other perspectives such as the NDRC 
to assist them in the legal battle (Carter 2018). A resident of Newark 
attended one of those meetings to learn how to use her lead water filter. 
“It made me feel like the city actually gave a crap, after them denying 
the whole thing all summer. It was so up in the air for a while but at 
least now we know what’s going on” (Adams 2018). 
When the Natural Resources Defense Council caught wind 
of the situation in Newark, they filed a lawsuit along with the New 
Jersey Education Workers Caucus against the city of Newark on June 
26, 2018 for non-compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act, the 
Lead and Copper Rule, and the Open Public Records Act (Anselm 
2018). They sued the Newark city officials as well as the NJ 
Department of Environmental Protection for the slow responses to the 
issue and lack of mitigation strategies. Newark was supposed to be 
fixing the presented lead problem through anti-corrosive treatment, 
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distribution of water filters and alternative water sources to affected 
homes, replacing old lead pipelines, and notifying the public. The 
lawsuit itself has largely been used to bring the issue to light and 
further inform the public. The city’s failure to implement these 
strategies and comply with federal requirements puts them at risk of 
losing this lawsuit and may face criminal charges or pay out a 
settlement, much like Flint in 2017 (CNN 2018). A powerful strategy 
employed by the NRDC was comparing it to Flint, Michigan (Newark 
City Communications 2018). The high-profile case caught national 
attention in 2014 and 2015 with videos and news stories featuring sick 
children, brown water in containers from local taps, and long lines for 
access to safe drinking water. This comparison is an effective tool 
because demographics in Newark and Flint are fairly similar, hosting 
a population of predominantly poorer people of color, and convincing 
residents to expect a similar lack of concern and action seen in Flint, 
in their own situation. This strategy is arguably the most impactful 
because it incites fear in the community and generates media buzz 
that brings attention to the issue and puts pressure on city officials. 
The NRDC relies on state-based science as well, with their 
employment of over 600 scientists and lawyers throughout the 
organization working to provide means for communities to fight for 
their rights to clean air, water, and land. Their collaboration with 
community members and the interdisciplinary crossovers between 
science and law also reflects the philosophy of liberal pluralism. Both 
of these philosophies aim to benefit the residents, whether it be in the 
form of public health in state-based science or making sure their voice 
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is heard. Underprivileged communities face higher health risks due to 
environmental stressors. Their concerns are often overlooked as well, 
creating areas of our country that are experiencing severe 
environmental struggles with no means of fixing them. Liberal 
pluralism works to combat this disconnect between the people and 
their governments by promoting collaboration and offering spaces for 
community members to voice their concerns. 
The initial strategy of the City of Newark, much like Flint, 
was to deny there was a problem with the drinking water. Andrea 
Adebowale, the city’s director of Water and Sewer Utilities released 
a statement following the lawsuit on June 26th claiming the 
accusations that Newark residents were suffering from dangerous 
levels of lead were “absolutely and outrageously false” (Newark City 
Communications 2018). The statement also specified that even 
though they owned the water mains, service lines that connect water 
supplies to homes were not under their jurisdiction, leaving the 
replacement responsibility to the homeowners (Newark City 
Communications 2018). They also claimed when the Watershed 
Conservation and Development Corporation – the water service 
responsible for water treatment of the city - went bankrupt, “very few 
documents were turned over to us […] NRDC requested reports that 
we simply do not have” (Newark City Communications 2018). When 
contacted, Andrea Adebowale’s secretary declined to make a 
statement, only saying “we’re doing everything we can about the 
situation” (Newark City Communications 2018).   
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In late October, a significant change in the case occurred. It 
was discovered by outside experts that lead was not leeching in 
through the service lines but that the city’s water treatment plant had 
malfunctioned, and the anti-corrosive chemicals were no longer 
adhering to the pipes (Yi 2018). This revelation changed the course 
of Newark’s mitigation strategies. At first, they were facing a $60 
million, 8-year process to replace all lead service lines in the city and 
assist homeowners with costs (Yi 2018). Now the city has to do 
damage control and insist that they were unaware of the true 
underlying issue. They began community outreach and education 
programs to show residents how to install lead filters for the 3- to 8-
month period it would take the treatment plant to fully flush out the 
old water (Carter 2018). The city is also going door to door handing 
out lead filters to the most at-risk households and providing tools to 
determine if your house has lead service lines (Yi 2018). One resident 
of Newark City stated, “I was put at ease when [the mayor] said ‘This 
is not Flint,’” (Carter 2018). The city’s strategy previously relied 
heavily on state-based science when they insisted that the lead was 
coming from the service lines, not the main line and therefore did not 
violate the Safe Drinking Water Act or the Lead and Copper Rule. 
Their community outreach and city hall sessions show influences of 
liberal pluralism as well. With the new discovery, the City of Newark 
could be held liable for violating these statutes by not having 
sufficient upkeep of their water treatment plant. 
 
 
58 
 
Conclusion 
 This case raises many important points about responsibility 
of action, discriminatory influence, and the power of previous cases 
on current ones. As shown in the Newark case, the division of 
responsibility in the Clean Water and Safe Drinking Water Acts 
presents difficulties between state and local governments. Even after 
the DEP issued two non-compliance warnings to the City of Newark, 
they still did nothing to remedy the situation. This lack of enforcement 
creates a gap between the levels of government, creating significant 
problems when the localities are not complying with federal laws.  
The discriminatory bias shown in both the Flint and Newark 
cases sheds light on a larger issue in the United States as a whole. 
Poorer, non-white communities are not treated as equally as their 
affluent counterparts. If either of these lead issues had occurred in a 
place like Saddle River, NJ which is 75% white with a poverty rate of 
0.51%, their concerns probably would have been taken more seriously 
(Data USA 2018). However, because the victims in the parts of 
Newark with the oldest pipes and more degraded infrastructure were 
predominantly black or Hispanic, an implicit bias may have been 
applied to the mitigation strategies. The city’s lack of urgency, as well 
as flat out denying there was a lead problem in Newark demonstrates 
a bias that was also seen in Flint. This nation’s institutional and 
historical racism through housing, employment, and educational 
discrimination achieved a pseudo-segregation that resulted in certain 
groups of people disproportionately bearing environmental burdens, 
and not being heard when the issue reaches crisis-level. Luckily for 
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Newark, once the city realized its mistake in diagnosing the source of 
the lead, it worked to help those in need.  
Their lack of initiative in the beginning of the investigation 
when 20% of homes were testing above the federal action level 
suggests that the city did not know about the treatment plant problems. 
Their failure to act despite warnings weakens the power of the State 
as well as the Clean Water Act, SDWA, and Lead and Copper Rule. 
It would have been significantly more expensive to replace all 
existing lead service lines in Newark than to fix the treatment plant 
and would have put the cost burden on individual homeowners in the 
area (Yi 2018). The City of Newark should be held accountable for 
not complying with the two notices issued by the DEP, whether they 
were aware of the treatment plant problem or not. Lead is different 
from many other contaminants because no level is safe to humans. 
Especially since the city has a history of reporting the highest 
childhood blood lead levels in the nation, they should have taken the 
warnings more seriously instead of denying there was even a problem. 
If they had started proper investigations earlier on, they could have 
prevented thousands of residents from probable lead exposure. 
Finally, the comparison of the Flint, MI case to Newark’s 
shows the power of previous public health disasters and their impacts 
on current issues. Once the real problem was identified, Newark 
worked much faster than the City of Flint to provide safe drinking 
water to their citizens and other solutions to the lead problem. Flint 
took almost four years to reach a point of being able to drink water 
from taps again, while Newark took a little over a year once the old 
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water was flushed out. The City of Newark knew this issue could 
blow up as much as Flint did and acted quickly to reassure citizens 
and the media that they are doing everything they can to remedy the 
situation. The jury is still out (literally) on whether the City of Newark 
will be held legally responsible for the lead problem in Newark, but 
it is likely they will be, once factors of non-compliance and 
institutional discrimination are considered.  
 
Appendix A: Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map created by the Natural Resources Defense Council 
tracking Newark City water testing (Imperiale and Woods 2018). 
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